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The HEALTH LAW & PUBLIC POLICY FORUM

OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE

Researchers Without Borders?:
Limiting Obligations of Ancillary Care Through the Rescue Model
Michael Ulrich
With the expansion of clinical research in developing countries, there is a need to explain obligations that
researchers have to their subjects beyond those required by the study protocol. This paper outlines a
model founded on the duty to rescue that provides ethical clarification of the obligations of ancillary care.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The burgeoning business of clinical research has an increasing prevalence in developing countries,
where it is easier to recruit a large number of participants and costs are drastically reduced.1 When
educated and well-funded research teams venture into communities with few resources and almost no
education, the imbalance raises ethical questions far more frequently than in the context of research in
developed countries. Questions arise over what the researchers owe to the host population and what
obligations they have to the individual research subjects. The burdens undertaken by the host country and
the risk undertaken by the individual subjects are distinct and may be addressed under different ethical
frameworks.2 This paper seeks to provide guidance with regard to the obligations researchers owe
individual subjects.
Some scholars advocate that researchers owe ancillary care to research subjects. Ancillary care is the
provision of care to research subjects that is beyond the requirements of what is needed to reach scientific
validity and research objectives, or prevent and rectify research-related injuries.3
Differing models of ancillary care have been suggested, most of which focus on the researcher-subject
relationship and the duties that arise from it.4 This approach can create problems of when obligations end,5
1

Angela Ballantyne, ‘Fair Benefits’ Accounts of Exploitation Require a Normative Principle of Fairness: Response to Gbadegesin
and Wendler, and Emanuel et al., 22 BIOETHICS 239, 240 (2008).
2
Proposals of reasonable availability suggest that companies from developed countries should not be allowed to subject populations in
poorer countries to the risks of a trial when researchers will simply take the new medical intervention back to their own country to sell
for profit. Ezekiel Emanuel et al., Moral Standards for Research in Developing Countries: From “Reasonable Availability” to “Fair
Benefits”, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 18 (2004) [hereinafter Moral Standards]. When a developing country is exposed to the risks of
research with few benefits in return there is an unethical risk of exploitation. Id. Therefore, those supporting reasonable availability
feel the population that participates in the trial deserves access to the medical intervention they are helping to generate. Id. Others
argue that because exploitation is about how much one receives, not merely what each party receives, reasonable availability is but
one of the benefits that a community may receive to avoid exploitation. Id. at 20. Instead the Fair Benefits framework allows for the
community to receive other benefits rather than requiring reasonable availability. Id. at 22.
3
Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 25, 26
(2004).
4
See id. at 27–28 (describing the foundation of the partial-entrustment model); Neal Dickert & David Wendler, Ancillary Care
Obligations of Medical Researchers, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 424, 426 (2009) (stating that the source of ancillary care obligations is
the researcher-subject relationship).
5
See Richardson & Belsky, supra note 3, at 30 (finding that ancillary care requirements only apply to those needs discovered through
study procedures).
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RESEARCHERS WITHOUT BORDERS
as well as what acts may fulfill ancillary care obligations.6 This paper seeks to address whether an
obligation to provide ancillary care exists, and then it proposes a model based on the duty to rescue.
It is not difficult to imagine that any given research subject in a developing country may have a
plethora of health care needs during their enrollment in the study. Yet, to mandate care for individual
subjects could severely deplete the budgets of many research trials and may dissuade researchers from
conducting studies in developing countries thereby preventing the benefits that can arise from this
important work. Determining what obligation, if any, researchers have to address subjects’ medical needs
and what limitations exist is imperative to conducting ethical research in developing countries.
II. PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL RESEARCH
The very definition of research is to create generalizable knowledge for the benefit of society.7 This
point is critical when considering the weight of potential obligations researchers have to individual
subjects.8 As such, ethical principles of autonomy, justice, and beneficence are largely in place to protect
the rights of individuals while pursuing this objective, rather than producing significant requirements of
positive action toward individual subjects.
For example, respecting a subject’s autonomy requires informed and voluntary consent and the ability
to withdraw from the study at any time.9 Justice requires a fair distribution of benefits and burdens,
ensuring that one group of people is not undertaking all the risk while another group is positioned to
receive the benefits.10 Beneficence obligates the research team to maximize the possible benefits and
minimize the possible harms.11 Given that beneficence creates a positive obligation, the consequences of
that positive action must be sufficiently outweighed by the amount of benefits created.12 Therefore,
beneficence is thought to be satisfied if the study has a favorable risk-benefit ratio.13 This determination is
made by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) prior to enrollment and, therefore, cannot and should not
factor in potential ancillary care, which may or may not be provided. And while all of these principles are
critical to performing ethical research, especially in the backdrop of a developing country, they traditionally
have created very few requirements with regard to individual subjects.
However, from beneficence stems secondary ethical principles of nonmaleficence, reciprocity, and
rescue, which do create obligations to individual subjects. Since nonmaleficence is a negative duty that
merely restricts conduct based on a responsibility not to inflict harm on others,14 it cannot require positive
actions of ancillary care. Reciprocity does require a proportional return of benefits to research subjects for
their voluntary enrollment in the study;15 however, reciprocity does not specify the type of benefit that must
6
See Dickert & Wendler, supra note 4, at 425 (discussing the potential for ancillary care obligations to extend beyond health care
services).
7
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH § A (1979) [hereinafter
BELMONT REPORT]. See also Ezekiel J, Emanuel, David Wendler, & Christine Grady, What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 2701, 2701 (2000) (“the overarching objective of clinical research is to develop generalizable knowledge to improve
health and/or increase understanding of human biology.”); Michelle N. Meyer, The Kindness of Strangers: The Donative Contract
Between Subjects and Researchers and the Non-Obligation to Return Individual Results of Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44,
44 (2008) (“by definition research seeks not to serve the interests of participants but to create generalizable knowledge designed to
benefit society and future participants.”).
8
See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 7, at § A (differentiating between clinical practice and clinical research).
9
Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 7, at 2706.
10
BELMONT REPORT, supra note 7, at § B(3).
11
Id. at B(2).
12
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 166 (Oxford University Press, 5th ed. 2001).
13
Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 7, at 2705–06.
14
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 12, at 113, 115.
15
Id. at 174.
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RESEARCHERS WITHOUT BORDERS
be received.16 Therefore, monetary compensation, aggregate study results, or access to medication or care
that subjects would not ordinarily receive, which is certainly likely in developing countries, would satisfy
this requirement.17 Furthermore, if subjects are to receive a benefit in exchange for their participation in
the study, presumably every subject should receive the same benefit.18 Since ancillary care may not be
necessary for every subject, and reciprocity can be fulfilled by other means besides ancillary care, this is
not a sufficient justification for the creation of an obligation.
The duty to rescue is unique in that it lies with all moral agents.19 The duty to rescue creates an ethical
obligation to help a person in need when no one else can help and aid can be provided without serious risk
to the rescuer.20 Subjects in developing countries are more than likely to have various health needs due to a
lack of health care resources. Since the duty to rescue applies to everyone, positive obligations of rescue
already lie with the research team. Moreover, researchers who choose to conduct trials in developing
countries place themselves in a position to help their research subjects and thereby separate themselves
from the general public.21 The question then becomes not whether this duty to rescue provides obligations
to provide ancillary care, but what care must be provided and who is eligible to receive it. When
examining ancillary care through the lens of the duty to rescue, the obligations and necessary limitations
become quite clear.
III. THE RESCUE MODEL
Any ancillary care obligation must fit within the ethical research framework of trying to attain
generalizable knowledge, rather than to undermine it.22 The clear limitations of obligations to individual
subjects found in the ethical foundations of research strongly support this notion. After all, it is ethically
impermissible to commit resources to certain subjects if it were to prevent completion of the study and
answer the research question.23 For the subjects who may not need ancillary care, there is an ethical
obligation to complete the study to justify the risks they undertook by entering the trial.24 Applying a duty
to rescue, which does not require action if there is a risk of harm, to ancillary care means the provision of
care would not be obligatory if providing it would be detrimental to the study itself.
This point is critical given the need to establish clear boundaries around the ancillary care obligation
and is one that appears to be ignored by those discussing ancillary care but choose to ignore the duty to
rescue underpinnings.25 The duty to rescue requires an action to help another when it is within the

16

Leslie A. Meltzer, Undesirable Implications of Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS
28, 28 (2006).
17
Id. at 29.
18
Id.
19
Richardson & Belsky, supra note 3, at 26.
20
Id.
21
Roger Brownsword, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Researchers: Reasonable but not Great Expectations, 35 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 679, 685 (2007).
22
See Maria W. Merritt, Holly A. Taylor, & Luke C. Mullany, Ancillary Care in Community-Based Public Health Intervention
Research, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 211, 214 (2010) (“A necessary condition for the ethical justification of health research with human
subjects is the study team’s ongoing fulfillment of the obligation to produce high-quality, scientifically valid results.”).
23
See Meyer, supra note 7, at 45 (discussing the paradox of expecting subjects to be motivated to volunteer for research because of its
ultimate goal, meanwhile requiring duties of researchers to individuals that would undercut the devotion of maximum available
resources to the research ends).
24
Id.
25
See Merritt, Taylor, & Mullany, supra note 22, at 212 (asserting that the duty to rescue is fundamental and, yet, has been
underanalyzed in the ancillary care literature). See also Leah Belsky & Henry S. Richardson, Medical Researchers’ Ancillary Care
Responsibilities, 328 BRITISH MED. J. 1494, 1494 (2004) (finding that a general duty to rescue creates too broad an obligation that
may drain limited human and financial resources). They also imply that obligating researchers under a duty to rescue fails to
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rescuer’s capacity.26 Therefore, a study with a small budget would not be required to provide care, such as
surgical treatment, that would drain resources needed to complete the trial. Acting within one’s capabilities
would not only limit obligations due to budget constraints, but certainly a research team would also not be
expected to provide care they were not sufficiently trained for either.27
The rescue model’s ability to limit obligations that jeopardize the overall goal of the study prevents the
need to create an inflexible link between the scope of care and the study protocol.28 For example, if a child
enrolled in a malaria study appears to have an infected leg wound, a research team with the capabilities to
care for the leg wound would be required by obligations of rescue to care for the infection despite being
unrelated to the study protocol.29 By anchoring ancillary care obligations to the duty to rescue rather than
to the researcher-subject relationship, as other prominent models do,30 the rescue model also avoids the
uncomfortable idea that this same child’s infection may be ignored simply because the researcher only has
met with the child once. The duty to rescue allows for obligations to be enhanced by special
relationships,31 while those subjects that are seen only briefly are still treated as whole persons rather than a
means to an end.32 Therefore, any medical need the researcher becomes aware of during an interaction
with a study subject is eligible for ancillary care.
While a subject who meets with the research team only briefly should be eligible for ancillary care, it is
imperative to limit who the researchers owe obligations to. The limits of a researcher’s requirement cannot
extend beyond those who volunteer for the study. After all, the discussion involves care that is ancillary to
that which the study would already be providing. This also appropriately eliminates the possibility of
fulfilling ancillary care obligations by providing services outside the scope of care for a pressing health
need, and it justifiably prevents obligations from being fulfilled by providing any benefits to those outside
of the research study.33
Delineating a scope of ancillary care that includes any medical need of a subject who volunteers for a
study is bound to seem unnecessarily broad, and has the potential to produce untenable burdens given the
context of developing countries. However, describing the conditions eligible for ancillary care and those a

acknowledge the goal of generalizable knowledge. Id. Again, the limits found within the duty to rescue that restrict actions that would
harm the study team’s ability to achieve their research goals avoid both of these problems.
26
See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 12, at 170 (stating that a poor swimmer has no obligation to swim out and try to save
someone drowning). However, there is a moral obligation to tell a lifeguard if one is nearby. Id.
27
This should not be used by researchers as an excuse to avoid providing ancillary care. If it can be reasonably assumed that the
research team will be presented with certain health conditions, they should have someone appropriately trained to address those
conditions if it is within their budgetary constraints.
28
See, e.g., Richardson & Belsky, supra note 3, at 30 (describing the scope of their partial-entrustment model being limited by the
nature of the study).
29
This example is utilized by Dickert & Wendler to distinguish their model from the Richardson & Belsky model, which they feel
inappropriately narrows the scope by requiring a relation to study procedures. Dickert & Wendler, supra note 4, at 426.
30
See id. at 426 (finding that Richardson & Belsky’s belief that ancillary care obligations stem from the researcher-subject relationship
is an accurate assessment).
31
See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L. J. 247, 247 (1980) (discussing the creation of a duty to rescue in
special relationships). Special relationships include husband and wife, shipmaster and crew, proprietor and customer, carrier and
passenger, educator and pupil, and employer and employee. Id. at n.1.
32
See Richardson & Belsky, supra note 3, at 29 (stating the importance of researchers treating subjects as whole persons instead of
means to an end).
33
Contra Dickert & Wendler, supra note 4, at 425 (describing ancillary care obligations being fulfilled by providing training to
address unemployment). The rescue model removes the possibility of fulfilling obligations without providing care for health needs
because other issues that may be addressed, such as unemployment or insufficient education, do not constitute an urgent need for care
that would give rise to a duty to rescue to prevent immediate harm. Additionally, the notion that providing employment training to
fulfill obligations of ancillary care run counterintuitive to the “care” aspect of the obligation, which presumably limits ethical
requirements to medical care needed by research subjects.
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researcher are required to provide care for are distinctly different.34 Rescue obligations arise when care is
needed and can be provided without presenting significant harm or burdens to the rescuer,35 which in this
case is the research team who is attempting to complete a specific study goal. This fundamental principle
essentially creates an inherent cost-benefit analysis in the rescue model that allows researchers to determine
if the benefits of providing the care sufficiently outweigh the harms, costs, or burdens that are likely to
incur to the overall study.36
With a strong possibility that many specific needs may arise in the study population, it is unlikely the
research team will be able to address them all.37 Therefore, it is essential that the team be able to
appropriately discern what ancillary care requirements are of the highest priority.38 At the same time,
“these efforts must not tax the workers’ ability to carry out their primary research-related assignments.”39
And while this balance may prove difficult at times, it is not unmanageable to the point of eradicating an
ethical obligation.
IV. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL CONCERNS
THERAPEUTIC MISCONCEPTION
Anytime research starts to delve into providing care outside of what is required by the research
protocol, there is concern over the possibility of misleading subjects and potential volunteers into entering
trials for the wrong reasons. A therapeutic misconception occurs when research subjects fail to grasp the
differences between the aims of clinical research and ordinary personal care, and thereby ascribe
therapeutic intent to research procedures.40 While the individual subjects’ personal health certainly is not
irrelevant, the ethical principles of research described earlier are in place to protect individual rights rather
than require positive actions to enhance each subject’s well-being. This leaves the researcher to pursue the
primary goal of generalizable knowledge, and distinguishes researchers from physicians.41
The chief concern with therapeutic misconception is that it may distort the subject’s ability to provide
informed consent, a cornerstone of ethical research and a requirement under principles of autonomy.42 In a
developing country, where subjects may be undereducated and in need of health care resources, the chances
of a therapeutic misconception exponentially increase.43 Consequently, a determination must be made
whether this concern rises to the level of limiting or preventing an ethical requirement to provide ancillary
care.
Important to this consideration is the fact that a therapeutic misconception does not mean the subject
does not understand the nature and purpose of the research or the procedures involved.44 In fact, a
34

See id. at 427 (explaining why expanding the scope of the Richardson & Belsky model does not necessitate expanding the care a
researcher must provide).
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 12, at 171.
36
See id. at 171 (affirming that rescue cannot be required if significant risks, costs, or burdens are created that offset the benefit).
37
Merritt, Taylor, & Mullany, supra note 22, at 215.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 214.
40
Charles W. Lidz & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Therapeutic Misconception: Problems and Solutions, 40 MED. CARE V–55, V–57
(2002).
41
Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and the Therapeutic Misconception, 17 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 20, 20 (1987).
42
Sam Horng & Christine Grady, Misunderstanding in Clinical Research: Distinguishing Therapeutic Misconception, Therapeutic
Misestimation, & Therapeutic Optimism, 25 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 11, 12 (2003).
43
See Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz, & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic Misconception in Clinical Research: Frequency and Risk
Factors, 26 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 6 (2004) (finding that lower education and poorer health contribute to misconstrued beliefs
about research trials).
44
Lidz & Appelbaum, supra note 40, at V–57.
35

32
VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL HEALTH LAW SOCIETY

VANDERBILT CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2523262

RESEARCHERS WITHOUT BORDERS

therapeutic misconception has been well documented in numerous trials in the United States despite the
best efforts of the staff to fully educate and inform subjects of a study’s purpose and procedures as well as
the fact that the aim is not to provide benefits to the individual subjects.45 Yet clinical trials continue. We
should not allow the therapeutic misconception to void the obligation to provide ancillary care in
developing countries.
Researchers should attempt to inform potential subjects of the risks and benefits of the research,
without including ancillary care, in as culturally competent a manner as possible. However, with limited
health care resources in many developing countries, it is highly probable that the research trial may present
the best means of receiving medical care, even without ancillary care provisions.46 The hope of receiving
some benefit from a research trial, known more accurately as therapeutic optimism, is distinctly different
than a therapeutic misconception and is not ethically problematic.47 As a result, anxiety about potential
therapeutic misconceptions cannot prevent ancillary care requirements.
IRB REVIEW
IRBs are tasked with determining whether a particular trial has a risk-benefit ratio favorable enough to
enroll subjects.48 IRBs are often criticized for inconsistent decisions.49 It is not always clear what
constitutes acceptable risks and potential benefits,50 and adding a moral obligation to provide ancillary care
may add to the complexity of that question. Furthermore, there is the troubling potential for IRBs to
erroneously consider the provision of ancillary care as a benefit to be weighed in the risk-benefit equation.
When examining potential benefits, IRBs should only consider benefits that subjects receive from the
procedures necessary to complete the research objectives.51 Extraneous benefits, including ancillary care,
cannot be considered because increasing care unrelated to the research study could ensure that risky
research that would otherwise be impermissible may be approved.52 Therefore, if IRBs are applying this
standard appropriately, then the provision of ancillary care would provide no concern for the authorization
of overly risky research. However, this is not always the case. IRBs frequently consider benefits accrued
from procedures unnecessary for research purposes.53
While this certainly presents a legitimate concern, it does not seem to insist that ancillary care should
not be provided. Similar to concerns over a therapeutic misconception, apprehension over IRB review
should not be used as an excuse to avoid a moral obligation of rescue. Rather, education of IRBs and reemphasizing the ethical guidelines they are expected to adhere to should be sufficient to warrant supplying
ancillary care. The fear of overly risky research being inappropriately approved due to ancillary care

45

See Paul S. Appelbaum, Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path Toward Avoiding the Therapeutic Misconception, 2 AM.
J. OF BIOETHICS 22, 23 (2002) (suggesting that over a variety of trials in the United States, as many as 70% of subjects suffered from a
therapeutic misconception). See also Paul S. Appelbaum et al., supra note 41, at 23 (describing the surprisingly high prevalence of
therapeutic misconception in a study where the entire project was reviewed extensively over several days).
46
Ballantyne, supra note 1, at 242.
47
Horng & Grady, supra note 42, at 14.
48
Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research in Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical Research,
189 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 930, 934 (2004).
49
Charles Weijer & Paul B. Miller, When are Research Risks Reasonable in Relation to Anticipated Benefits?, 10 NATURE MED. 570,
570 (2004).
50
Id.
51
Emanuel et al., supra note 48, at 934.
52
Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, supra note 7, at 2705.
53
See Seema Shah et al., How do Institutional Review Boards Apply the Federal Risk and Benefit Standards for Pediatric Research?,
291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 476, 480 (2004) (discussing studies showing a majority of IRBs considered psychological counseling, which
was unnecessary for the ultimate research goal, as a benefit to the subject).
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should be further diminished by the fact that while a research team must anticipate and prepare for
providing this care, they do not need to detail the exact care that will be given in a protocol.
DISCOURAGING FUTURE RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
While some research conducted in developing countries may be driven by the desire to cut costs or
even avoid certain regulations, there are plenty of studies that provide real and much needed benefits to
underserved populations. Whether the benefits they receive are from the trial itself or from a fair benefits
framework,54 developing countries are in need of any help they can get. Therefore, it is imperative that
researchers not be overburdened with obligations that may discourage their work, an outcome that could
leave needy populations worse off.55
While requiring ancillary care does increase obligations of researchers in developing countries,
applying the rescue model effectively avoids the dilemma of possible discouragement.56 The rescue model
allows the researcher’s interest, which is the research goal, to remain the primary focus. In fact, it requires
the research to be the focal point. The rescue model allows researchers to fulfill an ethical obligation of
rescuing those in need while preventing onerous requirements that derail the study. The application of an
effective cost-benefit analysis ensures that only urgent, necessary care that will have a significant impact on
a subject’s health will be obligatory.
V. CONCLUSION
Issues arising from conducting research in populations riddled with health needs are likely to become
more prevalent as trials in developing countries expand. As such, the need for clearly delineated
obligations and limitations to research subjects cannot be understated. The rescue model establishes an
ethical base in the duty to rescue, a moral obligation that already exists for researchers. The rescue model
creates a requirement of providing ancillary care that fits within the current ethical research framework,
rather than producing a paradigm shift to generate obligations to individual subjects from principles
historically thought to protect individual rights. Additionally, it allows for a broader scope of care to be
eligible while a cost-benefit analysis ensures that the goal of producing generalizable knowledge is
maintained as the primary focus. Thus, ethical obligations to all research subjects are fulfilled while the
benefits to society, and those populations in need, may still be sought.

54

See generally Moral Standards, supra note 2, at 22 (describing the fair benefits framework).
Dickert & Wendler, supra note 4, at 425.
See Merritt, Taylor, & Mullany, supra note 22, at 215 (stating the importance of identifying a model that recognizes ancillary care
obligations without creating disincentives for research on conditions that afflict the poorest populations).

55
56
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